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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
This paper examines the various legal frameworks governing micro-targeting in 
political campaigns in 6 states: Canada, Brazil, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. It 
aims to assess national practices as well as point out gaps in their respective 
frameworks. The paper commences by examining how micro-targeting is 
defined and thereafter examines the legal provisions applicable to micro-
targeting activities.  
 
Defining micro-targeting  
There is no clear statutory definition of the practice in any of the 6 states. Micro-
targeting is in fact the culmination of a series of activities which are themselves 
most often well-defined and regulated (such as collecting of personal data, 
using the data for profiling and transmitting personalised communications to 
individual voters). As a result, the legal frameworks governing political micro-
targeting are most often piecemeal provisions relating to different aspects of 
data protection, privacy and electoral law, which in turn present a number of 
gaps and loopholes that campaigns can easily exploit.  
 
Collection of personal data 
Access to personal data is a fundamental pre-condition for campaigns and 
advertisers to engage in micro-targeting practices. As a first step, campaigns 
typically collect the so-called identifiers, i.e. the data that uniquely identify an 
individual such as for instance the name or the address. Such data can be 
obtained through a number of channels, although by far the most common way 
is through electoral registers. 
The analysis revealed a lack of consistency across the board with respect to 
how information from electoral registers is made available to third parties. At 
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one end of the spectrum, voters’ lists are widely accessible to different groups 
under a range of purposes – the UK being a leading example –, whereas in 
other cases it is possible to observe a generalised trend towards limiting access 
to the registers. Barring access to commercial entities is now common practice, 
while political entities in different forms remain widely allowed to access the 
information contained in the lists, either in full or at least in part. The cases of 
France, where the law has devised a dynamic test to assess the reasons 
supporting a request to access electors’ lists and their commercial nature, and 
Canada, where the law provides a static definition of legitimate purposes to 
access the lists and makes an offence of the others, are examples of the 
possible different approaches that law-makers can resort to.      
However, these measures are unfortunately far from enough – largely for two 
reasons. Firstly, it proves difficult to strike a suitable balance between competing 
interests: the growing awareness of the risks related with data exploitation need 
to be balanced out against the principle of openness of the electoral process, 
and the legitimate interest of parties and campaigns to engage with voters in 
fulfilment of their own right to freedom of expression and the public’s right to 
receive information relevant to the political debate. Second, the current 
dynamics of micro-targeting concern a much broader range of personal data 
than those traditionally considered essential or relevant in the political context, 
some of which is granted enhanced protection. Detailed information revealing 
general interests and behaviours is increasingly relied upon in order to develop 
more individualised profiles.  
Data from the electoral register acts as a ‘spine’ on which to add more granular 
information from other sources. Collection of this additional data, while not 
prohibited, is hindered by the GDPR (applicable to Italy, France and Spain) as it 
likely requires the consent of the data subject and imposes a data minimisation 
principle which would be breached by a blanket collection of personal data. 
Spanish law is particularly restrictive, as an impact assessment report and an 
advisory report from the DPA may be required for such data collection. In Brazil, 
processing personal data also requires consent by the data subject. Canadian 
privacy laws do not apply to political parties (except for the province of British 
Columbia) which are only subject to a special regime that requires them to 
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submit and publish policies for protecting personal information. They are not 
subject to minimum standards and their practices are not subject to oversight 
by an independent body. Collection of personal data within British Columbia 
requires the consent (with a few exceptions) of the data subject.  
The collection of data on individuals’ lifestyle is a relative novelty in the field of 
political communication, and most of the available regulation and guidance in 
this respect comes from data protection authorities’ guidelines and other soft-
law sources. The practical measures introduced by the different authorities 
change even significantly from one case to another, although some trends can 
be observed across the countries considered in this study. The leeway granted 
to political organisations seems to be generally narrowing down, as authorities 
are now evidently paying attention and expect parties and campaigns to 
comply with more stringent procedures. There is an increasing emphasis on the 
transparency of data collection: the purpose of using data for political 
communications is now generally expected to be communicated explicitly, even 
in case the data is collected from third parties, and the subject’s consent 
cannot be normally implied. Two general models seem to emerge from a 
comparative perspective, with a major divide between those countries that 
exclude the possibility of processing some categories of data even with the 
subject’s consent, and others that instead consider consent a lawful ground for 
processing any categories of data.  
 
Using the data for profiling 
Using the collected data to infer information about voters is not prohibited but 
would in most cases require explicit consent under the GDPR, in those countries 
that are EU Member States. The DPAs in the UK and Italy have developed 
detailed guidance in this area. The Italian DPA emphasises the informed consent 
of the data subject through simplifying consent notices. In France data cross-
matching and profiling likely requires consent, while Spain appears to entirely 
ban the processing of sensitive personal data even with the consent of the data 
subject. France and Spain stand out amongst the EU countries for a lack of 
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guidance from their DPAs in this area. In Brazil, the processing of sensitive 
personal data requires express consent. Canadian privacy laws would also likely 
require the consent of the data subject for profiling, but these provisions do not 
apply to political parties outside of British Columbia.   
 
At this stage of the process, the countries considered show a significant degree 
of diversification in their respective approaches. Most notably, significant 
differences exist between countries whose data protection authorities have 
provided relevant guidance, in a more or less detailed form, and others where 
the relevant framework is largely silent on the issue. Other differences emerge in 
the role played by the data subject’s consent, in some cases a sufficient legal 
basis for cross-matching but not in all the countries examined, and the need for 
detailed guidance as to the different aims and circumstances that lead to 
situations where cross-matching would not be allowed or the controller would 
need to comply with further requirements – a profile in which respect several of 
the frameworks examined seem to lack of clarity at present. 
 
Sending out tailored messages (Micro-targeting) 
The final step in micro-targeting is the sending out of tailored messages. It is not 
prohibited in any of the countries nor is it subject to specific consent 
requirements. Rather, all the countries have adopted measures to improve 
transparency. These provisions vary in both scope and efficacy but largely seek 
to enable voters to easily identify political advertisements as well as the identity 
of the senders.   
In Spain all electoral messaging is to be explicitly labelled as such and the 
sender’s identity is to be provided. French law contains a similar provision though 
it only applies three months before a general election month. In Brazil political 
advertisements are to be clearly identified and can only be contracted by 
political parties, candidates or their representatives. In the UK electoral 
publications that are printed must identify the source and the government has 
committed itself to an “imprint requirement” that would compel online campaign 
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material to show where an advertisement has come from and how it has been 
funded. Canada has adopted a novel approach and has created a single, 
publicly available and searchable, online database of political adverts that 
have been published on online platforms.  
Although each legal jurisdiction has taken a different approach to improving the 
transparency of political direct marketing online, it is clear that such 
personalised communications must be suitably transparent for recipients to fully 
understand their nature and origin. The most common means of ensuring such 
transparency is through the introduction of an ‘imprint requirement’ for online 
political ads. However, such a requirement must be properly drafted and cover 
election material at all times, not only during a specific campaigning period. An 
alternative and most promising method which has been used successfully in 
Canada is the introduction of a database where members of the public can 
readily access information on any online advertising messages.  




Direct marketing has significant potential for being used as an exploitative form 
of digital campaigning because the origins of personalised communications is 
often unclear. Targeted messages may be disseminated by a wide range of 
actors – campaigners posing as individuals, fake social media accounts, or 
automated software programs (‘bots’) – without the recipient being aware that 
these messages are part of a political campaign.1 
The use of direct marketing by political campaigns can be particularly difficult to 
trace when carried out through social media platforms. “List-based” targeting 
tools, for instance, are widely made available by social media platforms to 
advertisers (including political campaigns) allowing them to match any lists of 
data they may already have (such as for instance email addresses of 
supporters) with the platform’s own user database.2 This enables political 
messages to be sent via social channels where recipients are less readily able to 
identify the source of communications.3 The use of “lookalike” tools enables 
campaigns to communicate with a wider audience based on the characteristics 
of the original “list-based” group without requisite consent.4 “Viral marketing” (or 
“tell a friend” campaigns) in particular make it difficult for targeted individuals to 
recognise the true nature of political messages or posts being shared online.5  
Recent major initiatives taken at either the national or supranational level have 
admittedly demonstrated an increasing concern from multiple quarters to 
increase the transparency of data-driven political advertising. From a 
comparative perspective, most European countries require that political 
 




2 See Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Direct marketing code of practice. Draft code for 
consultation’, 90. 
3 ICO, Guidance on political campaigning: draft framework code for consultation, 2019 at p.89 
4 Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, Full Disclosure: Political Parties, Campaign Data, and Voter 
Consent’, 2019, B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 07 26 https://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/2278  
5 ICO, Guidance on political campaigning: draft framework code for consultation, 2019 at p.79 
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advertising on traditional media is ‘properly identified and labelled as such’.6 The 
emphasis on transparency has been also reprised in the most relevant examples 
of such recent efforts at the EU level, the Communication on Tackling online 
disinformation7 and the Code of Practice on disinformation, which indeed require 
digital platforms, amongst other commitments, to implement policies against 
misrepresentation, prioritise authentic information, close fake accounts and mark 
bots’ activities. 
Although some social media platforms have attempted to develop their own 
political advertising standards, these efforts have been criticised for ‘lacking 
teeth and being easy to subject by bad actors’.8 The Code of Practice has been 
described as a ‘a fairly messy and in some ways structurally incoherent 
document’9 most likely to prove ineffective, for the reason, amongst others, that 
it treats the issue of disinformation as one of malicious content, and as such is 
‘[i]t cannot and will not capture all malicious content … it can’t prevent all – or 
perhaps even most – of the worst instances of “viral deception.”’10  
In light of the difficulties and limitations of content governance, there is an 
urgent need to focus on those practices that fuel it and enable disinformation to 
spread, such as the systematic collection of vast amounts of data, individual 
profiling and targeted communications.11 In this study, we present a comparative 
analysis of six different national approaches with regard to the regulation of 
data-driven targeting and political campaigns, in the spirit of highlighting some 
emerging common trends and some persisting gaps, as well as some unique 
features of the systems considered.  
 
6 Iva Nenadić, ‘Unpacking the “European approach” to tackling challenges of disinformation and 
political manipulation’ (2019) 8 Internet Policy Review 1, 4. 
7 European Commission, Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, COM/2018/236. 
8 Open Rights Group, Imprints: who’s responsible?, 31 March 2020, available at: 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2020/imprints-who’s-responsible. 
9 Peter H Chase, ‘The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation: The Difficulty of Regulating a Nebulous 
Problem’, 14. Working paper of the Transatlantic Working Group on Content Moderation Online and 
Freedom of Expression, 2019 available at: 
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/EU_Code_Practice_Disinformation_Aug_2019.pdf.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Privacy International, ‘Challenging Data Exploitation in Political Campaigning: PI Recommendations’, 
June 2020, pp 7-9, available at: https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2020-
06/PI%20Recs_Challenging%20Data%20Exploitation%20in%20Political%20Campaigning.pdf.  
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After a brief overview of how micro-targeting is defined in the different countries 
considered in this study (i.e. Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Spain and the UK), the 
analysis focuses on the legal frameworks regulating a range of activities that, 
each in a different way, contribute to allowing for the exploitation of individual 
data and micro-targeting practices, such as accessing voters’ identifiers from 
the electoral registers; collecting data on the individual’s lifestyle; data profiling 
and cross-matching; the delivery of personalised communications.  Due to its 
complex, multi-faceted nature, political micro-targeting is difficult to regulate 
with a single, comprehensive legal framework – as indeed none of the countries 
examined does. Instead, the relevant provisions are usually to be found across 
multiple statutes or regulations, variably relating to different aspects of data 
protection, electoral campaigns and general media and communications law, 
often adding a further element of opacity to understanding which types of 
conduct are allowed and which are not. The lack of clear and easily accessible 
regulatory frameworks poses a risk in that any regulatory gaps could be 
exploited by platforms or campaigns. 
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2 DEFINING THE ISSUE OF ‘MICRO-
TARGETING’ 
As micro-targeting practices emerge at the global level, one apparent difficulty 
is that the field of political advertising has been traditionally regulated in 
strikingly different manners across different countries. Even within the EU and in 
relation to traditional media, definitions of ‘political advertising’ can change 
significantly from one Member State to another12 and a common framework is 
not included in the recently revised AudioVisual Media Services Directive or other 
similar provisions. 13 
Against this background, the lack of clear statutory definition of micro-targeting 
in any of the six countries subject of this analysis is hardly surprising. However, 
the Data Protection Authorities (‘DPAs’) in the UK and Canada have sought to 
explain what the term encompasses. The information Commissioners Office in 
the UK (ICO, UK) has defined it as: 
‘a form of online targeted advertising that analyses personal data to 
identify the interests of a specific audience or individual in order to 
influence their actions. Microtargeting may be used to offer a personalised 
message to an individual or audience using an online service such as social 
media. Microtargeting may determine what and how relevant content is 
delivered to an individual online and is sometimes used to market goods or 
services and for political marketing’.14 
This definition has been relied on by the Scottish Law Commission and the Law 
Commission for England and Wales.15  
 
12 Christina Holtz-Bacha, ‘Regulation of Electoral Advertising in Europe’ in Christina Holtz-Bacha, 
Edoardo Novelli and Kevin Rafter (eds), Political Advertising in the 2014 European Parliament Elections 
(Palgrave Macmillan, London 2017) 27, 29-30. 
13 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/audiovisual-media-services-directive-avmsd  
14 ICO, Microtargeting, https://ico.org.uk/your-data-matters/be-data-aware/social-media-privacy-
settings/microtargeting/  
15 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Electoral Law: A joint final report, law Com No. 389, 
Scot Law Com No 256, 16 March 2020, at p.156 para 12.36, 
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The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (the DPA at the federal level) 
commissioned a report that referred to micro-targeting as ‘refined 
segmentation according to a host of demographic and attitudinal variables’.16 
The Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia (DPA 
at the district level) describes it as the type of targeting occuring ‘when a very 
narrow and highly specific category of people are chosen as an advertising 
target’.17   
In France, Spain and Italy there are only indirect references to micro-targeting. 
Firstly, at an EU level, the European Data Protection Supervisors (EDPS) opinion 
on online manipulation and personal data refers to the practice of micro-
targeting as consisting of ‘a more personal message to a segment of people 
sharing certain traits or even potentially determine the prices for products or 
services. It may consist in how social media platforms determine which content 
that appears on individual news feeds and in what order.’18  
The EU Commission guidance on the application of Union data protection law in 
the electoral context refers to offering ‘a personalised message to an individual 
or audience using an online service e.g. social media.’ 19 
At a national level, the French DPA has described it as a ‘challenging’ practice20 
and the Spanish DPA has referred to it as a form of ‘unproportional data 




16 CJ Bennett and RM Bayley, ‘Canadian Federal Political Parties and Personal Privacy Protection: A 
Comparative Analysis’ (2012) Privacy Research Papers: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2012/pp_201203_e.asp 
17 ‘INVESTIGATION REPORT P19-01 Full Disclosure: Political Parties, Campaign Data, and Voter Consent’ 
(Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia 2019) B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 07 25 
<https://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/2278> accessed 10 May 2020. 
https://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/2278  
18 Opinion 3/2018 of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on online manipulation and 
personal data, 9. 
19 European Commission - Commission guidance on the application of Union data protection law in the 
electoral, 7. 
20 ‘Communication Politique : Quelles Sont Les Règles Pour l’utilisation Des Données Issues Des Réseaux 
Sociaux ? | CNIL’ <https://www.cnil.fr/fr/communication-politique-quelles-sont-les-regles-pour-
lutilisation-des-donnees-issues-des-reseaux> accessed 2 July 2020. 
21 Article 6 (1). Circular 1/2019 (entered into force on 11 March 2019) of the Spanish Data Protection Agency 
(Agencia Española para la Protección de Datos (AEPD)), on the processing of personal data relating to 
political opinions and the sending of electoral propaganda by electronic means or systems of 
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types of processing in its DPIA list (issued pursuant to Art 35(4) GDPR) that 
conceivably cover micro-targeting: 
 
‘Large-scale evaluation or scoring, as well as any type of processing 
involving data subjects’ profiling or predicting aspects concerning ‘the 
data subject's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal 
preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour, location or movements, 




‘Any processing that entails the systematic use of data to observe, monitor 
or control data subjects, including the collection of data through networks, 
including when performed on-line or on apps, and the processing of unique 
identifiers that may be used to identify users of information society services, 
including web services, interactive TV, etcetera, with regard to consumption 
patterns and viewing data over extended periods. Processing of metadata, 
e.g. in the fields of telecommunications, banking etcetera, performed for 
profiling purposes or more in general for organisational, budgetary 
prediction, technology upgrade, network improvement, fraud prevention, 
anti-spam and security services, etcetera are also included in this 
category.’23  
 
In Brazil there is no clear definition of micro-targeting but the term ‘boost 
content’ appears to convey a similar meaning.24 It refers to ‘the mechanism or 
 
messaging by political parties, federations, coalitions and groups of voters under Article 58 bis of 
LOREG. 
22 Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, ‘Elenco delle tipologie di trattamenti soggetti al requisito 
di una valutazione d'impatto sulla protezione dei dati ai sensi dell’art. 35, comma 4, del Regolamento 
(UE) n. 2016/679 - 11 ottobre 2018’, para 1, available at: https://www.garanteprivacy.it/home/docweb/-
/docweb-display/docweb/9058979  
23 Ibid., para 3. 
24 Though this interpretation is subject to challenge as the Brazilian DPA who would have provided 
guidance on the meaning of the term is yet to be constituted.   
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service that, through contracting with Internet application providers, enhances 
the reach and dissemination of information to reach users who would not 
normally have access to its content, including among the forms of boost content 
the paid prioritization of content resulting from Internet search applications’.25 
 
2.1. IS DEFINING THE TERM IMPORTANT? 
The lack of a clear statutory definition in these six countries is addressed either 
directly by the DPA’s defining it (Spain, UK and Canada) or indirectly through the 
use of analogous terms (Brazil, France and Italy). The lack of a precise definition 
(both at the domestic level and in a comparative perspective) may not 
necessarily frustrate the purpose of regulating the phenomenon effectively, as 
long as the single activities associated with it are already covered by law.  
Micro-targeting, whether used as a marketing technique for products and 
services or in political campaigns, involves three steps: the collection of personal 
data, using the data for profiling and then sending out tailored messages. As the 
analysis in the next sections of this study will demonstrate, the first two steps of 
micro-targeting are generally defined and regulated by national policy- and 
law-makers and, as a result, the definition and regulation of the final step 
(micro-targeting) could appear superfluous.    
However, the analysis will also illustrate how micro-targeting practices in the 
political arena have their own specificities, as they stem from different motives 
than those deployed with purely commercial interests and are likely to impinge 
on fundamental rights in a different way.  
The more pertinent question therefore is whether to define and enact specific 
rules in relation to political micro-targeting as this activity generates greater 
 
25 art. 26, § 2 of Electoral Law (Law 9.504 of 30 September of 1997) 
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concerns when deployed in political campaigns than when it is used to market 
products or services.  
While its use in both fields creates significant privacy concerns, the former has 
the potential to significantly impair the functioning of a democracy. It has been 
argued that political micro-targeting can have direct effects such as voter 
manipulation and suppression, aggravate polarisation, perpetuate 
misinformation and have indirect long-term effects by incentivising political 
parties to ignore people that they deem are unlikely to vote leading to 
‘increased levels of voter disengagement and lower turnout’ and the resulting 
underrepresentation of groups of people.26 
If this is the case, then it stands to reason that it may be important to develop 
specific rules for the use of micro-targeting in political campaigns rather than 
rely on general data protection laws. This would require a working definition of 
the term. However as has been noted elsewhere ‘adopting such rules would be 
difficult for the EU, as different EU member states have different traditions in the 





26 Frederik J Zuiderveen Borgesius et Al., ‘Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for 
Democracy’ (2018) 14 Utrecht Law Review 87 
27 Tom Dobber et Al., ‘The regulation of online political micro-targeting in Europe’ (2019) 8 Internet Policy 
Review 
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3 ACCESS TO VOTERS’ IDENTIFIERS 
FROM THE ELECTORAL REGISTER 
Access to personal data is a fundamental pre-condition for campaigns and 
advertisers to engage in micro-targeting practices. As a first step, campaigns 
typically collect the so-called identifiers, i.e. the data that uniquely identify an 
individual such as for instance the name or the address. Such data can be 
obtained through a number of channels, including for instance directly from the 
voters, in the course of surveys or canvassing, although by far the most common 
way is through the electoral register. Access to identifiers is key to beginning the 
process of harnessing the potential of data for micro-targeting.  
In the EU, the collection and processing of such data is covered by the GDPR, 
particularly Article 5 principles of ‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’, 
‘purpose limitation’ and ‘data minimisation’ are particularly relevant. Moreover, 
the kind of data that would be collected in any effective micro-targeting 
campaign such as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs are considered to be a special category of personal data 
whose processing save for a few exceptions is prohibited. One such exception 
under Article 9 (2)(d) allows political parties to process this data provided it 
relates to their members or former members who ‘have regular contact with it’ 
but they are prohibited from disclosing such data to outside bodies without the 
consent of the data subject.  
Micro-targeting in Europe is hindered at the first stage as it is difficult to collect 
data about people.28 The two countries not covered by the GDPR (Canada29 and 
Brazil30) have similar provisions in their data protection laws. Nonetheless, 
 
28  Tom Dobber et Al., ‘The regulation of online political micro-targeting in Europe’ (2019) 8 Internet Policy 
Review. 
29 S. 6, 10-12 Personal Information Protection Act of British Columbia; S. 5, Schedule 1 Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.  
30 Article 5, 6 & 11 Law 13.709 of 14 August 2018 (General Data Protection Law in Portuguese, Lei Geral de 
Proteção de Dados Pessoais (LGPD) .  
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relevant data is still accessible through a range of sources in the public domain, 
including electoral registers. 
 
 
3.1 THE INFORMATION INCLUDED IN ELECTORAL 
REGISTERS 
Despite the increasingly restrictive frameworks offered by data protection laws 
at the national or supranational level, the collection of individual data remains 
lawful in a number of circumstances, most commonly – in the context of political 
communications – through surveys and canvassing, or via electoral registers.  
Information included in the electoral registers has slight variations from a country 
to another, ranging from a minimum core including such as their names, address, 
and electoral number in the UK;31 to which other countries add further 
information useful to identify voters and their demographics, like their date and 
place of birth in France32 and Italy.33 In Spain, the Electoral Census adds to all 
these a further requirement such as national identity number34 while the inclusion 
of any further specific information is forbidden by the law.35 The Canadian 
federal law requires electoral registers to include all this information alongside 
an identification document containing photograph and service number36 and 
any other information that the Chief Electoral Officer considers necessary.37 
However, laws at provincial level can require different information: in the 
province of Alberta, the register includes details of gender, citizenship and date 
 
31 Representation of the People Act 1983 s.9(5-6).  
32 Electoral Code, Article L. 16.  
33 Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica no. 223/1967, Art 5. 
34 article 32(1) LOREG.  
35 Article 41(2) LOREG.  
36 S. 211.2(4). 
37 S.49(2). 
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of birth,38 addresses, postal codes and telephone numbers39 although the law 
limits the purpose of such details to verifying the list when revising the register.40 
Provincial law in British Columbia allows to omit or conceal voter information in 
order to protect privacy or security.41 
It is worth noting that some countries have different versions of electoral 
registers: in the UK, for instance, there are two versions of the electoral register: 
the full register and the open (edited) register. Access to voters’ identifiers differs 
between these two registers:42 the full register includes names and address of 
everyone who is registered to vote, unless an individual decides to register to 
vote anonymously,43 whereas the edited register contains only the names and 
addresses of those electors who have not opted out of it, either at the time of 
applying for registration,44 or by notifying the registration officer.45 In Canada 
exist both a Register of Electors, which lists any persons currently qualified as 
electors, and a Register of future Electors Canadian which lists citizens aged 
between 14-17. It is entirely voluntary and the information is not shared with 
political parties.46 A further distinction exists between preliminary and official list 
of electors; the former includes only the  name and address of each elector in 
the electoral district and the identifier,47 whereas the latter also includes 
information of each electors’ polling division48 and is made available to each 
registered or eligible (i.e. a party that has satisfied the criteria for registration 
but has not yet registered) party that request them and to each candidate for 
their respective electoral district.49 
 
38 Elections Act (Alberta) S.13 (2).  
39 S. 17 
40 S.13(3) and S.17(3). 
41 Election Act (British Columbia) s. 51 (4).  
42 Information Commissioner’s Office, “Guidance on political campaigning: draft framework code for 
consultation”, 2019, at p.50 available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-
ico/consultations/2615563/guidance-on-political-campaigning-draft-framework-code-for-
consultation.pdf 
43 The Electoral Commission, The electoral register, 6 April 2020, available at: 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/i-am-a/voter/electoral-register   
44 r.26(1)(h) RP(S)R and RP(E/W)R; r.27(1)(f) RP(NI)R 
45 r.93A(1) RP(S)R and RP(E/W)R   
46 Elections Canada, ‘FAQs about the Register of Future Electors’ 
<https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&document=faqfut&lang=e#gen1> 
accessed 27 May 2020. 
47 93 (2) 
48 S.107 
49 93 (1)-(4).  




3.2 ACCESS TO THE REGISTERS 
Electoral registers, either in full or in part, are commonly made available to third 
parties, including both public and private entities. A general attitude towards 
openness and transparency in electoral matters has, for a long time, 
underpinned a widespread approach that voters’ lists would be in the public 
domain and accessible to any interested person. However, in more recent times, 
growing concerns for voters’ privacy and data protection have led in some 
cases to a change of culture, as illustrated below in the cases of Italy and 
Canada, for instance.  
Nonetheless, it is still possible to observe instances of access to voters’ lists 
granted on a widespread basis: for instance, in the UK, government departments 
and credit reference agencies are among the most common users of the full 
register, alongside political parties, campaigners, parliamentary and local 
government office holders, and candidates for election,50 although the 
information contained in the register cannot be shared with any other person.51 
Copies of the open register can be purchased anyway from the registration 
officer by any person on payment of a fee,52 and in fact are routinely acquired 
by businesses, charities, marketing firms and online directory firms.53 
But most commonly access is granted specifically to individuals and 
organisations involved in electoral competitions: in France, candidates, political 
parties and other various groups54 can obtain a copy of from local public offices 
under the condition of not making commercial use of it55 and in Spain the 
register is available to candidates and their representatives.56 The Italian case is 
 
50 r.103-104-105 RP(S)A; r.103-105 RP(NI)R; r.103-105 RP(W/E)R.  
51 r.101(6) RP(S)R; r.101(6) RP(NI)R; r.102(6) RP(E/W)R. 
52 r.109 RP(S)R; r.108 RP(NI)R; r.110 RP(E/W)R. 
53 ICO, Electoral Register.  
54 Electoral Code, Article L. 330-4. 
55 Instruction on the Keeping of Electoral Lists and Supplementary Electoral Lists 
56 Article 41(5) 
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exemplary of an approach becoming progressively more restrictive and yet still 
leaving ample leeway to political communication: whereas, in the late 1990s, the 
Italian Data Protection Authority had consistently maintained that electoral lists 
would be in the public domain and therefore accessible to any interested person 
irrespectively of their reason for accessing them,57 successive legislative acts 
have progressively narrowed the range of legitimate purposes to access such 
information, until the current framework – largely devised to ensure compliance 
with the GDPR – limits access for ‘purposes of electoral propaganda and 
relevant political communication’ to personal data extracted from electoral 
registers held in municipal offices, provisional registers of Italian citizens resident 
abroad entitled to the right to vote including those voting abroad in EU 
Parliament elections and other similar lists.58  
Outside Europe, the cases of Brazil and Canada offer two markedly different 
examples: in Brazil, political parties have full access to the information contained 
in the electoral register,59 which is also made accessible to any public and 
private institutions and the general public, provided that basic principles of 
intimacy, private life, honour and personal image are respected.60 In Canada, 
the law provides a relatively stricter framework, pursuant to which a registered 
party that endorsed a candidate in the electoral district in the last election can 
obtain a copy of the list of electors for the electoral district taken from the 
Register of Electors. Such lists, however, only include electors’ names, addresses 




57 Garante 22 luglio 1997, in Bollettino n. 1, pag. 43; 20 aprile 1998, in Bollettino n. 4, pag. 13.  
58 Provvedimento in materia di propaganda elettorale e comunicazione politica - 18 aprile 2019, para. 3 
available at: https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-
display/docweb/9105201  
59 Law 9.096 of 19 September 1995 Art 19§ (3) 
60 Resolution 21.538 of 14 October 2003 of the Superior Electoral Court Art 29. 
61 Elections Act ( S.C. 2000, c. 9) S.45(2). 
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3.3 GROUNDS TO ACCESS THE REGISTERS 
Different countries also take different approaches to the purposes for which 
access to electoral registers is granted. In some cases, it is possible to access 
information about voters for purposes largely irrelevant to political 
communications: in the UK, it is possible to buy copies of the full register and use 
the data for purposes including the administration of justice, enforcement of 
criminal law, vetting applications for credit, prevention of money laundering and 
statistical analysis of credit risk assessment.62 Similarly, the open register can be 
sold for a wide range of purposes, including building (potential) customer 
databases in the private sector.63 
By contrast, the approach taken by Spanish law seems particularly restrictive, as 
in fact it only allows access if requested through judicial channels.64 In France, 
access to electors’ lists can only be granted for non-commercial purposes;65 this 
is assessed on the basis of a number of different indicators, such as the purpose 
of the intended activity, the legal status of the entity seeking to use the data, 
whether the  of the re-user and whether or not the use is costly being mere 
indications in this respect; in any case, the circumstance where the data would 
be used to generate profit would be a decisive factor to consider the activity 
purely commercial.66 The Italian law has progressively narrowed down the range 
of legitimate purposes to access electoral lists, once more in compliance with 
the GDPR: the long list of legitimate purposes including statistical, scientific or 
historical research, societal welfare and the generic ‘common or public good’67 
provided for by a 2003 statute has now been abrogated, seemingly leaving only 
 
62 r.103-104-105 RP(S)A; r.103-105 RP(NI)R; r.103-105 RP(W/E)R  
63 ICO, Electoral Register 
64 Article 41(2) 
65 Instruction on the Keeping of Electoral Lists and Supplementary Electoral Lists 
66 Notice 20091074.  
67 D.lgs. 196/2003 Art 177 
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active and passive electoral rights as a legitimate reason to access electoral 
lists.68 
In Canada, political parties and candidates can use electoral lists for 
communicating with electors, including using  them for soliciting contributions 
and recruiting party members.69 Any other use of the list is prohibited by the law70 
and constitutes and offence.71 Much on a similar line, provincial laws forbid any 
further use other than communicating with electors, including for soliciting 
contributions and recruiting party members.72 The provincial law of British 
Columbia allows the Chief electoral officer to include fictitious voter information 
so that unauthorised use can be traced.73 
The analysis revealed a good degree of consistency across the board with 
respect to the kind of information included in the registers. More variety can be 
observed, instead, in how this information is made available to third parties. At 
one end of the spectrum, the UK is the case where voters’ lists are widely 
accessible to different groups and in pursuit of different interests, whereas in 
other cases it is possible to observe a generalised trend towards limiting access 
to the registers. Barring access to commercial entities is now common practice, 
while political entities in different forms remain widely allowed to access the 
information contained in the lists, either in full or at least in part. The cases of 
France, where the law has devised a sort of dynamic test to assess the validity 
of the reasons for a request to access electors’ lists and their commercial nature, 
and Canada, where the law provides a static definition of legitimate purposes 
to access the lists and makes an offence of the others, are examples of the 
possible different approaches that law-makers can resort to.      
However, these measures are unfortunately far from enough – largely for two 
ranges of reasons. Firstly, it proves difficult to strike a suitable balance between 
competing interests: the growing awareness of the risks related with data 
 
68 Provvedimento in materia di propaganda elettorale e comunicazione politica - 18 aprile 2019, 
available at https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-
display/docweb/9105201 
69 S.110.   
70 S. 111 
71 S. 487 (1) (b).  
72 Elections Act (Alberta) S20.  
73 Election Act (British Columbia) S. 51(3). 
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exploitation need to be balanced out against the principle of openness of the 
electoral process, and the legitimate interest of parties and campaigns to 
engage with voters in fulfilment of their own right to freedom of expression and 
the public’s right to receive information relevant to the political debate. 
On the other hand, the current dynamics of micro-targeting concern a much 
broader range of personal data than those traditionally considered as ‘political’ 
and granted enhanced protection. Other information revealing more general 
interests and behaviours are increasingly relied on in order to develop more 
individualised profiles.  
 
  
MICRO-TARGETING IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: A comparative analysis of legal frameworks 
25 
 
4 COLLECTING DATA ON 
INDIVIDUALS’ LIFESTYLE 
By collecting data on individuals’ lifestyle, campaigns are able to develop 
comprehensive behavioural tracking profiles of individual users, which in turn 
allows them to develop a range of different messages each tailored to appeal a 
different ‘type’ of voter. The UK’s ICO has recognised that this is common 
practice for political parties and candidates, who normally use the register “as a 
‘spine’ on which to add more granular and detailed information”.74 Permissive 
frameworks to access and collect lifestyle data about individuals are thus a 
major enabler for targeted digital messages. 
According to the ICO, there are three methods by which personal data can be 
collected from third parties, some of which constitute a breach of the GDPR or 
domestic law. Firstly, buying or renting a list of contact details from third parties 
will be a breach of GDPR and possibly the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Regulations unless the data subject has given explicit and 
specific consent. The practice of obtaining an individual’s consent to use their 
data via a third party is only legitimate where the data subject had given their 
consent in a specific manner, rather than through a generic wording such as 
‘selected third parties’, ‘trusted partners’ or ‘for political campaigning 
purposes’.75 Secondly, buying or renting factual personal data from a data 
broker or other third party is only permissible under condition that the data 
subject is given the appropriate information, including the buyer’s privacy 
information.76 Thirdly, the practice of buying or renting inferred personal data 
must comply with the GDPR when the nature of the data makes the data 
subject identifiable (otherwise, if the inferred data is anonymised it does not 
constitute personal data) and thus buyers are required to treat this data in the 
same way as factual personal data.77 The UK’s ICO guidance also establishes a 
 
74 ICO, Guidance on political campaigning: draft framework code for consultation, 2019, at pp.51-52  
75 ICO, Guidance on political campaigning: draft framework code for consultation, 2019, at p.58.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., p.59. 
MICRO-TARGETING IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: A comparative analysis of legal frameworks 
26 
 
duty of due diligence over data acquired from third parties, expecting parties to 
be able to demonstrate their compliance and be accountable.78 
In principle, personal data from social media can be processed by political 
campaigners, however a key factor stressed by the ICO is that the public 
availability of information does not automatically deprive it of protection. GDPR 
and Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR) safeguards still 
apply and, as a result, blanket collections of personal data from online sources 
including social media platforms are likely to constitute a breach of the data 
minimisation principle.79 In fact, obtaining data in any of these ways 
automatically makes a party a data controller and as such expected to carry 
out a DPIA and mitigate against the risks.80 In case a party or organisation runs a 
dedicated page on a social media platform, they qualify as a joint controller 
and therefore bear a joint responsibility for complying with data protection laws 
alongside the platform: they will need to provide appropriate privacy 
information to users and also ensure that the platform is also aware of the 
relevant obligations.81 
The French data protection authority has released detailed guidance82 for the 
use of data extracted from social networks. Inspired to a general principle of 
data minimisation, the guidance clarifies that making regular contact with a 
party or organisation through a specific channel (such as e-mails or a social 
network platforms) does not automatically imply a general consent to engage 
through other different means. Parties have limited options to harvest data from 
one channel and re-use it on a different one, depending on the level of pre-
existing engagement with an individual: where a party was already in regular 
contact with a data subject through a channel, it would be allowed to reach out 
to them (for instance, by e-mail or private message) for the sole purpose of 
offering them regular electronic contact, although, should the person decline the 
 
78 Ibid., p.59. 
79 Ibid., 61-63. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., p.61-62. 
82 Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés, ‘Communication politique: quelles sont les 
règles pour l'utilisation des données issues des réseaux sociaux?’ [Political communication: what are the 
rules for using data from social networks?], 2016, https://www.cnil.fr/fr/communication-politique-
quelles-sont-les-regles-pour-lutilisation-des-donnees-issues-des-reseaux.  
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invite or not follow through, the party should have to delete the relevant 
information from their database. Occasional contacts (such as social media 
users who engaged occasionally with the party’s profile, for instance by ‘liking’ it) 
but collecting any further data of theirs would be considered unfair. However, it 
would still be allowed to reach an occasional contact through the usual medium 
in order to obtain their consent to the collection of additional data concerning 
them. Other practices, such as collecting data from users with whom there has 
been no previous contact, or from social media’s ‘friends’ lists’ of users with 
whom the party has been in contact, either regularly or occasionally, are 
forbidden.  
In Spain, personal data extracted from websites and other publicly accessible 
sources may be used for political purposes during electoral campaigns.83 The 
electoral law only provides a fairly outdated framework leaving most current 
practices void of a solid legal basis, other than political surveys. However, more 
recent provisions seem to have introduced a less permissive regime: recent 
guidance from the data protection authority clarifies that such operations are 
only allowed during an electoral campaign (it is only possible to start making 
preparations, such as performing impact assessment or appoint a data 
protection officer) and at the end of the campaign the data must be deleted.84 
Organic Law 3/2018 has removed public interest as a permissible ground to 
process special category data and prohibits any processing of data for the 
main purpose of identifying a data subject’s ideology, trade union membership, 
religion, sexual orientation, beliefs or racial or ethnic origin even when the 
individual had consented to it.85 In practice, Circular 1/2019 seems to have 
completely banned the most common practices leading to micro-targeting, 
making it difficult for political parties to collect information on people’s lifestyle 
for political purposes. Article 7(4) of Circular 1/2019 establishes that the 
processing of any activity that may pose a risk to data subjects requires an 
impact assessment report and the advisory of the Spanish Data Protection 
 
83 LOREG Art 58 bis (2). 
84 Circular 1/2019 (entered into force on 11 March 2019) of the Spanish Data Protection Agency (Agencia 
Española para la Protección de Datos (AEPD)).  
85 Organic Law of Personal Data Protection and Digital Rights Guarantee 3/2018.  
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Agency to perform such activities, inserting a further hurdle for collecting lifestyle 
data about voters.  
The Italian approach seems more detailed and partially more permissible. 
Consent to using personal data for political communications needs to be given 
specifically and separately from other purposes for which the data may be used, 
either in writing or on digital support. The current framework reveals an evident 
privileged position granted to political parties and any organisation pursuing 
political aims in general, as they are given more leeway to use data for 
communications purposes; however at the same time they also bear specific 
responsibilities in the process. The framework provides guidance about both the 
different categories of data that may be used for political communication, and 
the modes of collection that constitute a lawful basis for further processing. 
With regard to the first issue, categories of data that may be used with the 
subject’s consent include: data collected in a professional or business-related 
capacity, or for reasons connected to health care by medical personnel;86 data 
included in telephone directories;87 data collected from the Internet (such as 
telephone numbers or e-mail addresses), including when obtained by dedicated 
softwares (web or data scraping), or made available by the data subjects on 
their social media profiles.88 Some other categories of data may be used by 
parties and political organisations without the subject’s consent, such as 
personal data extracted from registers in the public domain (e.g. electoral 
registers held in municipal offices; additional lists of nationals of an EU member 
state resident in Italy who intend to exercise their right to vote in local 
elections)89 and data of their own members and persons with whom they have 
regular contacts.90 By contrast, personal data obtained by elected officials in 
the exercise of their functions cannot be used in any case.91 
With regard to the second issue, the data subject’s explicit consent and the 
clear identification of political communications as the purpose of data collection 
 
86 Ibid., para. 5.C. 
87 Ibid., para. 5.D. 
88 Ibid., para. 5.E. 
89 Ibid., para. 3. 
90 Ibid., para 3.2.  
91 Ibid., para. 5.B. 
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and processing are the standard legal basis. However, a certain degree of 
flexibility seems allowed: for instance, individuals who once consented to have 
their data collected on an occasion which implied their adherence to the 
organisation and their programme may find themselves contacted for further 
analogous initiatives,  if the organisation’s statute explicitly acknowledged this 
possibility at the time.92 By contrast, if an association does not expressly pursue 
aims of political nature, then it may only use their members’ personal data for 
political communications after obtaining explicit consent for this further aim.93 
Political parties or individual candidates, when buying data from third parties, 
bear the duty to verify that the seller of the data had fulfilled all their legal 
obligations. Such a duty applies with regard to all the data subjects in case of 
databanks of modest dimensions (such as when they include a few hundreds or 
thousands of names) or, in case of larger databanks, to a sample objectively 
proportionate to the dimensions thereof, also having regard that the data 
collected is accurate and kept up to date.94 
In Brazil, the General Data Protection Law requires that any processing of 
personal data (such as personal data on racial or ethnic origin, religious 
conviction, political opinion, trade union membership or religious, philosophical or 
political organisation, data concerning health or sex life, genetic or biometric 
data when linked to a data subject95) happens with the subject’s specific 
consent,96 and in compliance with principles such as clarity of purpose, 
adequacy of the processing techniques with the purpose pursued, data 
minimisation, data subject’s right of access, accuracy, transparency, security, 
prevention of damage, non-discrimination and accountability.97 Unlike the 
Spanish law that discards consent as a lawful ground for processing of special 
categories of data, the Brazilian LGPD allows consent as a lawful ground for 
processing special categories of data, which are called sensitive personal data. 
 
92  Provvedimento in materia di propaganda elettorale e comunicazione politica - 18 aprile 2019, para. 
2.B, available at: https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-
display/docweb/9105201.  
93 Ibid., para. 2.A. 
94 Ibid., para 4.I. 
95 Art 5 
96 Article 11 
97 Article 6. 
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Canada is an example of an apparent legislative vacuum, as the Privacy Act 
regulates the collection of personal information by the federal government and 
the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) is 
only concerned with business and commercial activities;98 as political parties fit 
neither of the two categories they are consequently not subject to federal 
privacy laws. They are instead subject to a special regime introduced through 
amendments to the Elections Act in December 2018, which requires political 
parties to submit and publish policies for protecting personal information. 
The information presented by the parties ought to include: the types of personal 
information that the party collects and how it collects that information; how the 
party protects personal information under its control; how the party uses 
personal information under its control and under what circumstances that 
personal information may be sold to any person or entity; how the employees 
are trained; the party’s practices concerning on-line privacy and use of 
cookies.99 This provision has been criticised by the Chief electoral officer of 
Canada for its lack of minimum standards, oversight by an independent body, 
and mechanisms to allow Canadian citizens to validate or correct any 
information held by a party.100 
British Columbia is the only province in Canada whose privacy laws cover 
political parties. As per guidance from the Privacy Commissioner of British 
Columbia101 the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) governs the collection 
of personal information collected by political parties ‘within British Columbia or 
about British Columbians’. The statute requires that any organisation acquires 
the subject’s consent to collect, use or disseminate their data, after having 
 
98 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘Summary of Privacy Laws in Canada’ (15 May 2014) 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/privacy-laws-in-canada/02_05_d_15/#heading-0-0-2> 
accessed 28 May 2020.   
99 Elections Act  ( S.C. 2000, c. 9) S. 385 (2) 
100 Democracy Under Threat: Risks And Solutions In The Era Of Disinformation And Data Monopoly 




101 INVESTIGATION REPORT P19-01 Full Disclosure: Political Parties, Campaign Data, and Voter Consent’ 
(Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia 2019) B.C.I.P.C.D. No. 07 5 
<https://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/2278> accessed 10 May 2020. 
https://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/2278  
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communicated the purpose of the collection. It is possible in principle for an 
organisation to collect personal information from another without the consent of 
the individual, although the former must provide the latter with sufficient 
information regarding the purpose of the collection and allow it to determine 
whether the disclosure would be in accordance with the law.102 Personal 
information about an individual may be acquired without consent or from a 
source other than the individual, if the information was already available to the 
public through directory assistance, a professional or business directory, a public 
registry or in a printed or electronic publication.103 
As noted above, the collection of data on individuals’ lifestyle is a relative 
novelty in the field of political communication, and it does not come as a 
surprise if most of the available regulation and guidance in this respect comes 
from data protection authorities’ guidelines and other soft-law sources. In most 
cases, authorities such as the ICO in the UK, the CNIL in France, the Garante in 
Italy have demonstrated a good understanding of the most recent practices; 
the comprehensiveness of their guidance and the (relatively) swift time in which 
they were produced shows the increasingly central role played by data 
protection agencies (and comparable bodies) in this context. The practical 
measures introduced by the different authorities change even significantly from 
one case to another, although some trends can be observed across the 
countries considered in this study. The leeway granted to political organisations 
seems to be generally narrowing down, as authorities are now evidently paying 
attention and expect parties and campaigns to comply with more stringent 
procedures. There is an increasing emphasis on the transparency of data 
collection: the purpose of using data for political communications is now 
generally expected to be communicated explicitly, even in case the data is 
collected from third parties, and the subject’s consent cannot be normally 
implied. Parties who acquire data for political communications are also generally 
expected to bear the responsibility to check that all prescribed procedures were 
respected. Nonetheless, practical provisions change significantly from one case 
to another. From a comparative perspective, a major divide can be noted 
 
102 S. 10 (1).  
103 S. 12   (1).    
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between those countries that exclude the possibility of processing some 
categories of data even with the subject’s consent, and others that instead 
consider consent a lawful ground for processing any categories of data.  
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5 DATA CROSS-MATCHING AND 
PROFILING 
Cross-matching and profiling allow campaigns to collate information gathered 
through different sources and, through sophisticated data analysis, develop 
(potentially) extremely precise assessments of individual preferences, interests 
and behaviour. From a technical standpoint, these practices are different than 
the mere collection of personal data as they refer, instead, to the subsequent 
processing thereof in order to extract relevant information about the data 
sabjects. Technological developments in the last few years have made possible 
to scale up the granularity of such operations, which now allow to target 
individual voters rather than just broader groups based on demographic 
similarities such as gender or age. 
Data protection laws usually offer a degree of protection against abuses of 
such practices; however, while profiling is nowadays regularly used by marketers 
for commercial purposes, its use in the context of political campaigns proves 
more difficult to capture through general data protection laws as campaigns 
are often able to exploit gaps and loopholes, such as for instance the ‘public 
task’ basis for processing provided for in Art 6. For this reason, most recently 
regulators have begun to introduce bespoke provisions or guidance to specific 
address the issue and its specificities in the context of political communications.  
The Commission guidance on the application of the GDPR suggests that 
political micro-targeting would meet the threshold for requiring consent under 
the GDPR when it has a ‘legal or similarly significant effect on the individual’,104  
emphasising the importance of the ‘democratic vote’ and the fact that ‘it has 
the possible effect to stop individuals from voting or to make them vote in a 
specific way’.105  
 
104 Art.4(4), 22 GDPR. 
‘Commission Guidance on the Application of Union Data Protection Law in the Electoral Context’ 
(European Commission 2018) 8 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/soteu2018-data-protection-law-electoral-guidance-638_en.pdf>.  
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The guidance provided by the ICO in the UK allows any political party or 
candidate to carry out profiling for political campaigning purposes, provided 
that this is ‘carried out fairly, transparently and in compliance with the law’,106 
namely with requirements from the GDPR such as revising their privacy policy to 
inform individuals of the profiling being carried out, ensuring that collected 
personal data is kept accurate, and the amount of information collected and 
the length of time for which this will be kept is limited to the relevant purpose. 
The ICO also developed a list of questions designed to assess whether Art. 22 
GDPR is engaged by profiling carried out in the course of political campaigning; 
if the profiling carried out in the course of political campaigning is restricted by 
Art. 22, the ICO stipulates that a series of requirements must be met, including 
for instance obtaining the data subject’s explicit consent, and carrying out a 
DPIA. 
Another example of DPA that has developed detailed guidance is Italy, where 
the Garante released a set of guidelines for on-line profiling.107 These were, 
however, drafted in 2015, before the GDPR and the new Italian Data Protection 
Code were passed. The main underlying principles in the Guiding lines were 
those of informed consent and the principle that data collection should be 
related to the specific purpose sought. The articles in the old version of the 
Code to which the Guidelines made reference to have been formally abrogated, 
however the same principles are still part of the overall architecture of the GDPR. 
The Garante stressed that practices that consist of cross-matching users’ data 
should only be allowed if compliant with data protection, on condition that the 
contracting party or user has given their consent after being informed in 
accordance with simplified arrangements, and thus recommended a series of 
measures to make consent notices easily accessible to all data subjects (e.g. via 
a single click from the website’s landing page): any changes to the processing 
should be brought up to the data subjects in an easily understandable form, 
information to the data subjects should be organised on two levels so to make 
more immediately understandable, the same rules should apply to the same 
 
106 ICO, Guidance on political campaigning: draft framework code for consultation, 2019, at pp.68-69.  
107 Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, Linee guida in materia di trattamento di dati personali 
per profilazione on line, 2015. Available at: https://www.garanteprivacy.it/home/docweb/-/docweb-
display/docweb/3881513  
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types of processing irrespectively of the type of device which the data subject 
uses.  
Compared to these two examples, France and Spain stand out for a notable 
lack of relevant provisions in their respective legal frameworks. In France, law 78-
17 requires that any data cross-matching happens with the user’s consent, as 
any legitimate interest of the data controller cannot prevail in lack of certain 
conditions, such as the subject’s consent and a framework allowing them to 
object to such practices. In Spain, the law allows political parties to use personal 
data obtained from websites and other publicly accessible sources for the 
conduct of political activities during the electoral period.108 However, when the 
main purpose of data processing amounts to identifying the data subject’s 
sensitive information such as ideology, trade union membership, religion, sexual 
orientation, beliefs or racial or ethnic origin, processing could be forbidden even 
in presence of the subject’s consent.109  
In Canada such profiling would also likely require express consent.110 Moreover, 
the use of profiling to infer information about a voter such as their ethnicity and 
gender (these predictions are treated as ‘creating new information about a 
person’) is equally likely to require consent because this usage goes beyond the 
reasonable expectations of the data subject. Moreover, such predictive profiling 
may lead to the collection of inaccurate data which is equally contrary to the 
law.111  
In Brazil, the processing of sensitive personal data such as that used in profiling 
likely requires express consent112 and the data subject has a right to ”request a 
review of decisions taken solely on the basis of automated processing of 
 
108 LOREG Art 58bis. 
109 LOPDGDD Art 9. 
110 ‘INVESTIGATION REPORT P19-01 Full Disclosure: Political Parties, Campaign Data, and Voter Consent’ 
(Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia 2019) 23 <https://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-
reports/2278> accessed 10 May 2020; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘PIPEDA Report of 
Findings #2019-004: Joint Investigation of AggregateIQ Data Services Ltd. by the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada and the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia’ (26 November 2019) 
<https://priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-
businesses/2019/pipeda-2019-004/?wbdisable=true> accessed 29 May 2020. 
111 ‘INVESTIGATION REPORT P19-01 Full Disclosure: Political Parties, Campaign Data, and Voter Consent’ 
(Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia 2019) 22.  
112 Article 11 LGPD 
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personal data affecting his interests, including decisions aimed at defining his 
personal, professional, consumer and credit profile or personality aspects.” 113  
At this stage of the process, the countries considered show a significant degree 
of diversification in their respective approaches. Most notably, significant 
differences exist between countries whose data protection authorities have 
provided relevant guidance, in a more or less detailed form, and others where 
the relevant framework is largely silent on the issue. Other differences emerge in 
the role played by the data subject’s consent, in some cases a sufficient legal 
basis for cross-matching but not in all the countries examined, and the need for 
detailed guidance as to the different aims and circumstances that lead to 
situations where cross-matching would not be allowed or the controller would 
need to comply with further requirements – a profile in which respect several of 





113 Article 20 LGPD  





Where personal data has been collected from an individual and subjected to 
data cross-matching or profiling, the third step consists of using this information 
to send personalised communications to the data subject. The process is known 
broadly as ‘direct marketing’.114 It is becoming increasingly frequently used by 
political campaigns to promote candidates and influence potential voters.115 
This last step in the process of transmitting micro-targeted communications is 
most commonly addressed in the context of regulatory frameworks for political 
communications. Every jurisdiction examined in this comparative analysis has 
adopted legislative provisions to improve the transparency of digital political 
campaigning in some form. However, these approaches differ significantly and 
have had varying success.  
A particularly strong example is the provision in Spain which specifies that all 
electoral propaganda distributed by electronic messaging or social media 
networks “must state their electoral nature and the identity of the sender”.116 
Similarly in Brazil, a clear labelling requirement has been established as follows:  
‘It is forbidden to broadcast any type of paid electoral propaganda on the 
Internet, except for the boost content, provided that it is unequivocally 
identified as such and contracted exclusively by political parties, coalitions 
and candidates and their representatives.’117 
In France, online platform operators are under a clear obligation to  
‘…provide the user with fair, clear and transparent information on the 
identity of the person, the name, the registered office and corporate 
purpose of the legal entity and that of the legal entity for which it is 
 
114 For UK definition of “direct marketing” see Data Protection Act 2018 s.122(5)  
115 ICO, Guidance on political campaigning: draft framework code for consultation, 2019 at p.74 
116 Circular 1/2019 Article 11(3)  
117 Resolution 23.610 of 18 December 2019 Article 29  
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established, the account of which, where applicable, it has declared that it 
is acting, which pays to the platform remuneration in counterpart of the 
promotion of information content related to a debate of general interest.’118 
While the nature of the information that must be provided by platform operators 
has been explained in detail, a criticism of the French provision is that it applies 
only for the three months preceding the first day of the general election month 
until the date when the candidate is elected.119  
In the UK printed election publications must clearly identify the printer and 
promoter of the material,120 however this information is not yet obligatory for 
political direct marketing conducted digitally.121 The UK is subject to the Privacy 
and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 which stipulate 
that electronic mail may only be used for direct marketing purposes providing 
that the sender does not conceal their identity.122 However, according to the 
Information Commissioner’s Office, “electronic mail does not include advertising 
through social media and other online platforms, even where directed at 
particular individual”.123  
The Electoral Commission, Electoral Reform Society and Law Commissions have 
all voiced their support for the introduction of an “imprint requirement” in the UK 
that would compel online campaign material to show where the ad has come 
from and how it has been funded.124 This has already been agreed to by the 
Government which made a commitment in May 2019 to implement an imprints 
regime for election campaign material online.125 It is also worth noting that an 
imprint requirement for online election material has recently been extended to 
all referendums held in Scotland by the Referendums (Scotland) Act 2020.126 
 
118 Article L163-1  
119 Article L163-1 
120 Representation of the People Act 1983 s.110 and Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000  
121 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Electoral Law: A joint final report, law Com No. 389, 
Scot Law Com No 256, 16 March 2020, at p.157 para. 12.40 
122 Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 Reg 22 and 23  
123 ICO, Guidance on political campaigning: draft framework code for consultation, 2019, at p.79  
124 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Electoral Law: A joint final report, Law Com No.389, 
Scot Law Com No 256, 16 March 2020, recommendation 77 at p.201 para 15.77  
125 UK Government, Government safeguards UK elections, 5 May 2019, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-safeguards-uk-elections  
126 Referendums (Scotland) Act 2020 s.13 and Sch.3 para 28(1)(b) and (9)  
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In Italy, the Media Authority has introduced guidelines on the equality of access 
to online platforms which stress that the existing regulatory framework for the 
print and broadcast sector should apply as far as possible to online platforms 
also.127 These guidelines specifically state that:  
‘[a]dvertisers should clearly label political ads as such and identify their 
source, similarly to the requirements already in place for the print and 
broadcasting sectors.’128 
While the use of imprint requirements is one way to improve the transparency of 
personalised communications and direct marketing, another possibility for 
reform is creating a single, publicly available and searchable, online database of 
political adverts.129 This approach was adopted in Canada with the creation of 
the “Registry of Partisan Advertising Messages and Election Advertising 
Messages”. The statutory basis for this Registry establishes that:  
‘[t]he owner or operator of an online platform that sells, directly or 
indirectly, advertising space to the following persons and groups shall 
publish on the platform a registry of the persons’ and groups’ partisan 
advertising messages and election advertising messages published on the 
platform during that period.’130 
Although each legal jurisdiction subject to analysis has taken a different 
approach to improving the transparency of political direct marketing online, it is 
clear that such personalised communications must be suitably transparent for 
recipients to fully understand their nature and origin.  
The most common means of ensuring such transparency is through the 
introduction of an ‘imprint requirement’ for online political ads. However, such a 
 
127 Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Linee guida per la parità di accesso alle piattaforme 
online durante la campagna elettorale per le elezioni politiche 2018. Available at: 
https://www.agcom.it/documents/10179/9478149/Documento+generico+01-02-2018/45429524-3f31-
4195-bf46-4f2863af0ff6?version=1.0 
128 Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Linee guida per la parità di accesso alle piattaforme 
online durante la campagna elettorale per le elezioni politiche 2018 para.2  
129 Electoral Reform Society, Reigning in the Political Wild West: Campaign Rules for the 21st Century, 
February 2019 at p.13; see also Electoral Commission, Digital Campaigning – increasing transparency for 
voters, 13 August 2019, available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-
we-do/changing-electoral-law/transparent-digital-campaigning/report-digital-campaigning-
increasing-transparency-voters 
130 Elections Act (S.C. 2000, c.9) s.325.1(2)  
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requirement must be properly drafted and cover election material at all times, 
not only during a specific campaigning period.  
An alternative method which has been used successfully in Canada is the 
introduction of a database where members of the public can readily access 
information on any online advertising messages. This has great potential to 
improve the transparency of digital campaigning as a whole and there is 
legitimate scope for such a provision to be implemented in other jurisdictions, 
including the UK. In fact, this provision recalls closely the measure introduced, in 
the EU, with the Code of Practice on disinformation which now incentivises 
platforms to maintain repositories of political ads, although in the first annual 
self-assessment of the signatories released in late 2019 the Commission noted 
that the data available in these repositories was still limited, particularly in 
regard to the targeting criteria used by political advertisers.131 
  
 
131 EU Commission, ‘Annual self-assessment reports of signatories to the Code of Practice on 
Disinformation 2019’, at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/annual-self-
assessment-reports-signatories-code-practice-disinformation-2019.  
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7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The analysis has revealed a number of common trends and some striking 
differences across the six countries examined. 
None of those provides a comprehensive, unitary framework for micro-targeted 
political communications, and all resort instead to piecemeal approaches where 
the potential for gaps and loopholes is all too often exploited by campaigns. 
Against this background, Data Protection Authorities are often emerging as the 
regulators with the most systematic approach to tackle this challenge. A 
common finding from the comparative analysis is the general difficulty to bar 
access to personal data. The amount of data available in the public domain, 
and legitimate interests in making data available for promoting democratic 
engagement and similar aims often frustrate efforts to cut micro-targeting 
practices off at their origin. However, new emerging trends such as barring 
commercial entities from accessing electoral registers, a generalised increasing 
emphasis on the transparency of data collection, and expecting parties and 
campaigns to bear a responsibility for the legitimacy of their data processing 
practices are clear signs of a widespread growing awareness of the inherent 
risks of such form of communication. Conversely, the requirement of the consent 
of data subjects is in some cases now accompanied with further requirements, 
which in all likeliness is a sign of the rising recognition of the unsuitability of this 
sole condition to govern this field. 
With regard to personalised communications, each legal jurisdiction has taken a 
different approach to improving the transparency of political direct marketing 
online; despite the lack of consistency at the comparative level, transparency is 
evidently emerging as a key requisite to expect campaigns and other entities 
involved in such practices, either (as most commonly required at present) 
through the introduction of an ‘imprint requirement’ for online political ads, or 
other equivalent means.   
Comparative analysis suggests that, in light of current trends and technological 
developments, the most effective means of challenging exploitative digital 
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political campaigning in the context of direct marketing is to improve the 
transparency of online communications. However, emerging trends in regard to 
data collection and matching practices highlight the urgency of devising 
consistent and comprehensive legal frameworks to ensure that adequate 
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